Following its defeat in the Second Karabakh War and Azerbaijan's complete control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in September 2023, Armenia has begun to realize the need for a significant shift in its foreign policy. This new approach is marked by a gradual retreat from its long-standing strategic alliance with Russia after concluding that Moscow had abandoned Armenia during its conflict with Azerbaijan. In response, Armenia has sought to deepen its engagement with the West, particularly the European Union (EU), as part of a broader effort to diversify its global partnerships.
Armenia's evolving strategy aims to strike a balance between maintaining strategic autonomy and expanding cooperation with middle powers that operate beyond the rivalry between Russia and the West.
Key Indicators
Recent developments highlight Armenia's increasing collaboration with the West, especially as it seeks a more balanced foreign policy to secure a lasting peace with Azerbaijan. The West, in turn, has seized the opportunity presented by Armenia's diminishing trust in Russia as a security guarantor to establish a strategic presence in the South Caucasus. The following indicators illustrate this shift:
1. Extensive Western Military Support:
One of the most notable signs of Armenia's rapprochement with the West is the significant military cooperation and support it has received. Following its loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, Armenia's most pressing need is military and defensive, particularly as it distances itself from Russia, its long-time military ally. Historically, Russian arms accounted for about 98% of Armenia's total military imports. However, in recent times, Western countries have begun to fill this void, offering substantial military assistance, though it remains below 10% of Armenia's total military imports, according to Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of Armenia's Security Council.
This shift began with the United States launching limited military exercises with Armenia under the "Eagle Partner" program, the first held in September 2023 and the second in July 2024. These exercises aim to enhance interoperability among units participating in international peacekeeping missions. France also played a crucial role, agreeing in October 2023 to sell Armenia Ground Master 200 radars and Mistral anti-aircraft missiles while providing training for Armenian ground forces and supporting the modernization of its army. By November 2023, France began delivering rifles, radars, and armored vehicles to Armenian forces. Further strengthening this relationship, French Armed Forces Minister Sébastien Lecornu's visit to Yerevan in March 2024 led to additional agreements for rifle supplies and discussions regarding an air defense system. In June 2024, it was announced that France would sell Caesar self-propelled howitzers to Armenia.
The European Union has also contributed significantly. On July 22, 2024, the EU allocated €10 million to Armenia through the European Peace Facility, aimed at bolstering the logistical capabilities of the Armenian Armed Forces, enhancing their resilience, and preparing them for participation in future international missions, including EU-led operations. Moreover, Armenia consented to the deployment of an EU border monitoring mission along its southern border with Azerbaijan. This marked the first time the EU has stationed a mission in a country traditionally aligned with Russia.
These initiatives underscore the West's strategic intent to draw Armenia closer into its sphere of influence while simultaneously weakening Armenia's defense ties with Russia.
2. Facilitating Political and Economic Cooperation:
Western military support for Armenia has been complemented by significant political and economic cooperation, particularly in the context of Armenia's evolving relationship with the European Union (EU). This shift was highlighted by a resolution passed by the European Parliament on March 12, 2024, expressing strong support for deepening relations between Armenia and the EU. The resolution also emphasized that if Armenia chooses to apply for EU membership, the EU institutions should back this initiative. This development followed a statement by Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan on March 9, 2024, in which he indicated Yerevan's consideration of applying for EU membership.
In furthering this mutual effort to enhance ties, a joint summit between Armenia, the EU, and the United States was held in Brussels on April 5, 2024. The summit reaffirmed support for Armenia's European aspirations and included pledges to assist in its economic development. The EU committed €270 million in aid over the next four years, focusing on investment in Armenia's energy sector. At the same time, the United States announced €65 million in economic assistance aimed at boosting Armenia's economy, strengthening its resilience, and reducing its dependence on Russia.
A key outcome of the summit was a statement affirming the United States' commitment to ensuring a secure and reliable energy future for Armenia, with a focus on diversifying its energy sources. This is crucial, as Armenia's energy self-sufficiency is limited to just 30%, and the country remains heavily reliant on Moscow for energy supplies. During a visit to Yerevan in June 2024, US Assistant Secretary of State James O'Brien reaffirmed the US administration's ongoing support for Armenian governmental reforms across various sectors.
Moreover, on July 17, 2024, EU member states approved the start of formal negotiations to lift visa requirements for Armenian citizens, further solidifying Armenia's growing integration into European frameworks.
3. Dissolving the Alliance with Russia:
In tandem with Armenia's growing cooperation with the West, Yerevan has taken significant steps to gradually dissolve its long-standing strategic alliance with Russia. A key move in this direction came on February 22, 2024, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that Armenia had suspended its membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This marked a critical shift in Armenia's defense policy, distancing itself from Moscow's security umbrella.
Further signaling the breakdown of this alliance, Pashinyan announced on March 12, 2024, that Armenia had given Russia until August 1 to withdraw its border guard forces stationed at Zvartnots Airport in Yerevan, where they had been since 1992. By July 31, Russian forces had completed their withdrawal. This move drew sharp criticism from Russia's Foreign Ministry, which warned that Armenia was risking irreparable damage to Russian-Armenian relations, potentially jeopardizing its own security and economic stability.
Another significant development came on March 19, when it was reported that most Armenian banks would stop accepting the Russian MIR payment system by the end of the month, aligning themselves with Western sanctions against Russia. On June 12, Prime Minister Pashinyan reaffirmed Armenia's freeze on CSTO membership, signaling that the country intends to withdraw from the alliance when the timing is deemed appropriate.
Assessing the Trend: Armenia's Dilemma
Armenia's pursuit of deeper relations with the West stems from the belief that Western cooperation will offer security guarantees against its geopolitical challenges, particularly in its conflict with Azerbaijan. Armenia also hopes that a stronger Western presence in the South Caucasus will mediate a settlement with Azerbaijan. However, a closer assessment of this strategy reveals significant uncertainties driven by several key factors:
1. Opposing Positions:
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey are all strongly opposed to Armenia's pivot towards the West. Moscow holds considerable leverage over Armenia and can exert pressure to alter Yerevan's foreign policy. This includes cutting off natural gas exports, deporting Armenian laborers whose remittances form a crucial part of Armenia's economy, and exploiting Russia's control over Armenia's energy infrastructure. Armenia also remains heavily dependent on trade with Russia, with bilateral trade exceeding $4 billion in 2023. Moreover, Russian military forces are still stationed in Armenia, particularly at the 102nd military base in Gyumri, where about 3,000 soldiers are stationed, with their presence guaranteed until 2044.
Moscow could further escalate tensions by encouraging Azerbaijan to resume military operations against Armenia. In recent months, tensions have flared along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, with armed skirmishes taking place. Azerbaijan has also demonstrated military force, notably in Nakhchivan, on the Armenian border. On July 26, 2024, Baku accused Armenia of firing heavy weapons across the border, blaming the US and EU for provoking these incidents. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has criticized the April 5 summit between Armenia, the EU, and the US, claiming it aimed to isolate Azerbaijan.
Turkey's stance aligns closely with that of Moscow and Baku. Ankara criticized the same April 5 summit as biased, arguing that it undermines neutrality and risks turning the South Caucasus into a region of geopolitical confrontation. Turkey, which supported Azerbaijan's control over Nagorno-Karabakh, is unlikely to welcome Western involvement in Armenia's affairs and views it as a challenge to its influence in the region.
These opposing pressures suggest that Armenia's efforts to deepen ties with the West face significant challenges. Its relationships with neighboring countries are deeply intertwined and militarized, particularly with Azerbaijan. Implicit support from Russia and Turkey for Baku only compounds the geopolitical risks Armenia faces. This hostile regional environment may ultimately limit Yerevan's ability to fully pivot to the West and could significantly impact the trajectory of Armenia's foreign policy in the near future.
2. High Western Cost:
Despite the visible steps taken by Western nations to support Armenia, a closer analysis of the nature and scope of this aid reveals that the West—especially the European Union (EU) and the United States—may not be willing or able to fully bear the costs and risks associated with pulling Armenia entirely into its orbit. While Western countries have provided military supplies to Armenia, none have stepped forward to replace Russia as Armenia's security guarantor. This is a critical gap, as Armenia's defense infrastructure and security apparatus have been heavily reliant on Russia for decades.
Additionally, the economic assistance provided by the West, while notable, remains insufficient to meaningfully reduce Armenia's economic dependence on Moscow. Despite pledges of financial aid and investment, these efforts fall short of offering a robust alternative to Armenia's deep-rooted economic ties with Russia. Trade, energy supplies, and remittances from Armenians working in Russia continue to play a significant role in Yerevan's economy.
Moreover, the Western bloc has not demonstrated the capacity or influence necessary to compel Azerbaijan to sign a peace agreement with Armenia. In fact, it seems Armenia has been the one making concessions in peace negotiations. For instance, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced steps to amend the Armenian constitution, a key Azerbaijani demand for any peace deal. The current constitution asserts that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Armenian territory, and any amendments in this regard would mark a significant concession from Yerevan.
The long-term support required to wean Armenia off its reliance on Russia would involve substantial financial and material commitments—resources that the West appears unable to fully commit to. This is largely due to the high costs the West is already incurring from supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia, and the recent allocation of resources to Israel following the outbreak of conflict in Gaza since October 7, 2024.
Furthermore, Western powers do not have the strategic flexibility to expand their Cold War-like rivalry with Russia, China, and Iran to include the volatile Caucasus region. Doing so would heighten the risk of further destabilization and potentially more serious conflicts. For these reasons, the Western countries appear cautious about committing fully to Armenia's defense and development, which limits the extent to which they can act as a counterbalance to Russia in the region.
3. Transitional Alliances:
As Armenia navigates the long path towards solidifying its alliance with the West, it has sought alternative partnerships to fill the gaps, particularly in defense and military cooperation. These transitional alliances not only meet Armenia's immediate needs but also enhance its image of strategic balance in the region. Two key alliances have emerged in this context: one with India and the other with Iran. Both partnerships gained momentum in the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war, as Armenia sought new avenues for military and strategic support.
India has become a critical defense partner for Armenia. During the 2020 war, India backed Armenia, partly in response to Pakistan's support for Azerbaijan. This support manifested in significant defense cooperation. Armenia purchased four Swathi radars from India, and in 2022, the two countries signed an agreement for India to export missiles, rockets, and ammunition to Armenia. This was followed by a 2023 deal to export the Akash anti-aircraft system. By 2023, India had replaced Russia as Armenia's primary weapons supplier, underscoring the deepening of bilateral defense ties.
Similarly, Iran has played a crucial role in Armenia's defense strategy, particularly during and after the Nagorno-Karabakh war. While Iran has not directly supplied weapons to Armenia, it served as a key conduit for Indian arms deliveries. In 2023, Iranian media reported the presence of Iranian forces in Armenia's Syunik province, a strategic region bordering Azerbaijan. Further solidifying their defense cooperation, reports in July 2024 indicated that Armenia and Iran had signed a $500 million arms deal, which included advanced drones such as the Shahed 136, Shahed 129, and Shahed 197, as well as air defense systems like the Khordad 3, Majid, Khordad 15, and Arman.
However, whether the US and Europe are fully committed to supporting Armenia's complete departure from its alliance with Russia remains uncertain. Armenia's current geopolitical position resembles that of Ukraine and Georgia before Russia's invasions, where both countries took significant steps towards the West, triggering Moscow's retaliation. Yet, the likelihood of a similar Russian reaction in the short term is reduced, given Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine and its internal preoccupations.
The trajectory of Armenia's transformation will likely depend on two key factors: the outcome of the war in Ukraine and the extent to which the Western bloc pushes Armenia into becoming another front in its confrontation with Russia. If the West opts for a more cautious approach, Armenia may continue relying on its transitional alliances with India and Iran to maintain a semblance of strategic autonomy while navigating the complexities of its evolving foreign policy.
